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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, discussions regarding avoidance of choice-of-law
conflicts, or, more broadly, the mitigation and resolution of such
conflicts, have often touched on the phenomenon of judicial
globalization.' A major element of the developing global judicial culture
is increased cooperation among courts involved in international civil and
commercial litigation. This new cooperation re-imagines the judicial
role as a component of an integrated system, building on the recognition
that each court plays a part in a community of transnational
adjudication.2 Elements of the transjudicial approach include direct
communication between courts in different jurisdictions and judicial
deference granted to other courts, not merely as a matter of comity
among nations, but also as a matter of respect for other judges.
One achievement of this expanded view of the judicial community
is the creation of a framework within which judges can develop new
tools for resolving conflicts of substantive law. Commentators
frequently cite transnational bankruptcy proceedings as an example of
progress in this regard.' In multinational corporate insolvencies
involving bankruptcy proceedings in multiple jurisdictions, some judges
have worked directly with their counterparts in other countries. Rather
than using traditional choice-of-law methodology to select the law
1. Also referred to as transjudicialism, this broad rubric encompasses a variety of disparate
trends. Some, including those discussed in this article, relate to judicial behavior in the context
of civil and commercial litigation. Others manifest themselves in different contexts, and
include judicial reference to foreign law in domestic constitutional decisionmaking and the
integration of international human rights norms into domestic law. See generally Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial
Globalization]; Claire L'Heureux-Dub&, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998); Reem Bahdi,
Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in
Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 555 (2002); Symposium, Judicialization and
Globalization of the Judiciary, 38 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 397 (2003).
2. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 191
(2003); Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1459 (1991)
(describing international civil litigation as part of a larger process of "cross-fertilization"). See
also CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, Judicial Regulation of Improper Forum Selections, in
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION [Fourteenth
Sokol Colloquium] 273, 276-77 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) (sketching out the conditions of
a system in which judges could "speak to each other across borders").
3. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 567 (2003).
4. See Judicial Globalization, supra note 1, at 194.
5. See id. at 213; Westbrook, supra note 3, at 570-77.
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governing a particular issue, these courts have developed joint protocols
harmonizing the conflicting rules.6  Advocates hope the proposed
institutionalization of these channels for cross-border judicial
communication7 will provide an alternative to traditional methods of
resolving conflicts issues in international insolvencies.
Another achievement of the global view of judicial activity is that it
encourages judges to think in new ways about the role of jurisdictional
tools in managing conflicts. Judges sensitive to the needs of the
transnational judicial system, and to the fact that the work of that system
is shared among courts in different countries, are more likely to care
about identifying the best place for a case to be heard.8 Such judges are
therefore more likely to use the available mechanisms, such as dismissal
on the basis of forum non conveniens, a stay on the basis of lis alibi
pendens, or an antisuit injunction, to direct a case to that forum.9 Indeed,
commentators identify an increased interest in achieving the ideal
jurisdictional placement of cases as an important aspect of judicial
globalization. °
Although jurisdictional tools are not themselves choice-of-law
instruments, proper forum selection plays an important role in avoiding
choice-of-law conflicts. As Professor Blom observes elsewhere in this
issue, "j]urisdictional disputes often arise from expectations or hopes as
to choice of law and the jurisdictional outcome may determine whether
6. See Evan D. Flaschen et al., Foreign Representatives in U.S. Chapter 11 Cases: Filling
the Void in the Law of Multinational Insolvencies, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 3, 7-12 (2001)
(presenting an overview of cases involving such protocols). See also EVAN D. FLASCHEN &
RONALD J. SILVERMAN, The Role of Examiner as Facilitator and Harmonizer in the Maxwell
Communication Corporation International Insolvency, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 621, 625-45 (Jacob
Ziegel ed., 1994) (describing the role of the judges and the appointed examiner in harmonizing
inconsistent avoidance law in the Maxwell bankruptcy). The recently completed project of the
American Law Institute also promotes this sort of harmonization in bankruptcy. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF
COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES,
VOL. XXVIi (2003).
7. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law adopted the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency in 1997. Articles 25-27 of the model law encourage cooperation
among bankruptcy judges. G.A. Res. 158, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex I, at 11, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/158 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r52.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2004). The model law is presently being considered as incorporated in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Reform Act.
8. Slaughter, supra note 2, at 208-10.
9. Id.
10. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 568 (identifying the growing interest of courts in
"determin[ing] the optimal forum for each case").
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to apply one country's law or another's."' 1  This link between
jurisdictional allocation and the mitigation of choice-of-law conflicts is
explicit in forum non conveniens doctrine. As the earliest U.S. cases in
this area acknowledged, one factor courts should consider in forum non
conveniens analysis is whether dismissal would avoid both unnecessary
choice-of-law problems and the application of unfamiliar foreign law.'2
A judicial approach to cross-border litigation that is attuned to the
international system, and that encourages judges actively to seek the
optimal placement of cases, could therefore become a powerful force in
mitigating choice-of-law conflicts.13
The notion of more active judicial management of forum selection,
however, draws attention to one issue that has always been problematic
under U.S. law: the availability of forum non conveniens in contract
cases involving negotiated forum selection clauses. Althoughforum non
conveniens doctrine is generally analyzed and applied in the context of
tort litigation," it is available in contract cases as well. However, parties
to a contract often will have negotiated in advance a forum for the
resolution of potential disputes. The authority of the judge to monitor
forum selection for undue inconvenience - and, where appropriate, to
dismiss a case on that basis - may therefore be in tension with party
autonomy to select a forum. Although at least in terms of outcome the
clear trend in such litigation is to enforce the parties' agreement, cases
reflect substantial confusion in addressing the intersection betweenforum
non conveniens doctrine and the law on enforcement of forum selection
clauses. This article explores that intersection, examining the different
balances courts have struck between judicial discretion and party
autonomy in the forum selection process.
It is an opportune time to address this issue - not only because
recent literature on judicial globalization has drawn attention to the
judicial role in managing forum selection, but also because the Hague
Conference is currently developing a convention on choice of court
agreements.' 5 This convention, which represents a portion of the larger
11. Joost Blom, Whither Choice of Law? A Look at Canada and Australia, 12
WILLAMETrE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 211, 212 (2004).
12. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
13. Commentators in fact frequently use the list of public-interest factors in forum non
conveniens analysis as a starting point for broader discussions of judicial globalization and its
benefits. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708 (1998).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
15. Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, Hague Conference on
Private International Law, Work Doc. No. 1 l0E (revised April 2004), available at
http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-.wdl10_e.pdf. (last visited July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Choice
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Hague project on jurisdiction and judgments, will regulate the
enforcement of forum selection clauses in commercial contracts
involving parties from member states. 16 Its negotiation has highlighted
the substantial differences between U.S. law and the law of many other
countries on judicial discretion in forum selection. As discussed in more
detail below, most U.S. courts hold that forum non conveniens analysis is
relevant even in cases involving valid forum selection clauses." Other
legal systems, by contrast, reject judicial discretion to dismiss a case
based on convenience - many entirely, and virtually all in cases in which
the parties have negotiated an exclusive forum agreement. The current
draft of the convention would essentially eliminate a court's ability to
dismiss a case based on convenience if it has been chosen in an exclusive
forum selection clause. An examination of current practice in U.S.
courts on judicial discretion in contract litigation will assist consideration
of this proposal.
Part II of this article analyzes U.S. law on forum selection,
addressing both the role of contracting parties in selecting a forum and
the role of judges in correcting inappropriate selections. Part III then
uses a few illustrative cases to examine more closely the ways in which
expansive judicial discretion undermines contract goals. Finally, Part IV
turns to the draft convention on choice of court agreements, situating the
U.S. approach to forum selection within the international context.
II. FORUM SELECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT LITIGATION
A. Judicial Discretion and Party Autonomy
Although not every transnational contract includes a forum selection
clause, 8 most do, and the question of forum selection therefore requires
courts to balance interests of convenience against the bargained-for
expectations of the parties.
1. The Judicial Role in Jurisdictional Allocation: Forum Non
Conveniens
The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that a
of Court Convention]. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 15, at 1. The convention will also govern the
enforcement ofjudgments resulting from litigation in the chosen forum. Id.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. In such cases, analysis of forum selection generally proceeds as it would in tort cases,
since the private role is limited to the plaintiff's initial choice of forum in which to litigate.
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court may in its discretion dismiss litigation brought in the United States
in favor of litigation in a more convenient foreign forum.' 9 Dismissal is
appropriate only if an adequate alternative forum exists. 0 Once that has
been established, a U.S. court considering dismissal must evaluate
various public-interest and private-interest factors. 2' The private interests
relate primarily to the convenience of the parties and other participants in
the litigation, including such factors as access to relevant evidence, cost
of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and other factors "that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. '2 The public interests, on the
other hand, relate more to the convenience of the court and the judicial
system in general. They include administrative difficulties for busy
courts, the burden of jury duty, the interest "in having localized
controversies decided at home," and the difficulty for the court in
applying foreign law.23 Only if the balance of all factors weighs strongly
in favor of the defendant should the court order dismissal.24
The combination of private-interest and public-interest factors
reveals the two quite different goals served by U.S. forum non
conveniens analysis. One goal is to prevent the plaintiff from oppressing
the defendant "by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to
his own right to pursue his remedy."25 The other is to shield the court
itself, and other third parties, from unreasonable burdens imposed by the
plaintiff's choice of forum.26 The latter goal, which most other legal
systems do not share, has caused the U.S. doctrine to evolve into a
method used largely to locate the most appropriate jurisdiction for
litigation.27
The majority of cases applying this doctrine, and the vast majority
of the commentary regarding it, focus on its application in tort cases.
19. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). The transfer of a case to another
court within the federal system is governed by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2003). This
article focuses on dismissals in favor of foreign courts.
20. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
21. Id. at 241.
22. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
23. Id. at 509.
24. Id. at 508-09.
25. Id. at 508.
26. Id. at 508-09. In Gilbert's companion case, the Supreme Court articulated these as
alternative goals. See Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947) (stating that dismissal is available "upon a clear showing of facts which either (1)
establish such oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to
plaintiff's convenience.... or (2) make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of
considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems").
27. See Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum non Conveniens and the Hague Convention
on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467 (2002).
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This is because the advantages that plaintiffs generally seek when they
shop for a U.S. forum, such as a chance at punitive damages, are relevant
in tort cases. 28 Thus, when we think of forum non conveniens, we think
of the Bhopal disaster,29 or of product liability suits brought by foreign
plaintiffs against U.S. manufacturers. In such cases, to the extent there is
a role for private parties to play in selecting the forum, it is simply the
role of the plaintiff in choosing the court in which to initiate litigation.
This is a relatively weak role. If a plaintiff chooses a clearly
inappropriate forum in the hope of securing procedural or substantive
advantage, there is little reason to accord that choice much weight if it
causes substantial inconvenience to the other party and the court.3" In
practice, while the starting point of forum non conveniens analysis is that
the court should not disturb the plaintiffs choice of forum (although the
court may accord less deference to a foreign plaintiff),3 ' judicial
correction of private forum selection has become an important tool in
combating forum shopping.
The doctrine is also available, however, in the international contract
context. Even when the parties to a contract have included a privately
negotiated forum selection clause, the court is free to consider the
question of convenience.32 Here, the private role in forum selection is
stronger: when a bargained-for selection is part of the contract,
predictability and certainty in international contracting become relevant
goals. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted thirty years ago, "a contractual
provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is. .. an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
28. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 264 n.18 (citing strict liability in tort cases and jury trials as two
reasons that foreign plaintiffs find U.S. courts attractive). See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions, Negative Declarations, and Related Tools of
International Litigation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 314, 321 (1997) ( "[T]he real differences driving
forum shopping are usually not rules of substantive law, but the availability or unavailability
of juries, contingent fees, fee shifting, third-party discovery, class actions, punitive damages,
and similar differences .... ).
29. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634
F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
30. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 450 (1994) (describing forum non
conveniens as a solution to "the problem of plaintiffs' misusing venue").
31. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
32. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a (regarding this approach to the effect of a valid forum
selection clause). A party who has in essence waived its right to argue personal inconvenience
by agreeing to a particular forum in advance may not itself be permitted to move for dismissal
on the basis offorum non conveniens. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972). The court may raise convenience issues sua sponte, however, and could also consider
a convenience objection raised by a non-party. See id.
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essential to any international business transaction."33  Any judicial
correction of forum selection therefore comes at the cost not only of the
plaintiffs choice of jurisdiction, but also of the parties' expectations
regarding their bargain.
2. The Private Role in Jurisdictional Allocation: Forum Selection
Clauses
Historically, the private role in forum selection was no more
important in international contract cases than in other types of litigation.
Courts held negotiated forum agreements unenforceable on the ground
that their objective was to oust courts of their jurisdiction.34 Courts were
therefore free to disregard private agreements regarding forum when
considering dismissal based on convenience. With the 1972 decision in
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co, 35 however, the Supreme Court brought
the private role to the fore. The Court rejected the ouster analysis,
addressing court selection instead in more contract-based terms. It noted
that:
The elimination of all such uncertainties by
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both
parties is an indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting... [I]t would be unrealistic
to think that the parties did not conduct their
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with
the consequences of the forum clause figuring
prominently in their calculations. 6
On that basis, it held that private selection clauses are "prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances., 37  The
Court also approved the selection of a neutral forum - one otherwise
unconnected with the parties or the performance of the contract.
With respect to the balance between private choice and judicial
discretion in forum selection, the Court's decision had two major effects.
33. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
34. See generally Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138-40 (1982) (discussing the history of
the ouster argument).
35. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
36. Id. at 13-14.
37. Id. at 10. See also id. at 11 (noting that this approach "accords with ancient concepts of
freedom of contract").
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First, it introduced a form of convenience analysis different from that
used in traditional forum non conveniens cases, seemingly reducing the
judicial role to a consideration of public-interest factors alone. Second,
by approving the parties' choice of a neutral forum, it moved away from
the notion of a "natural" or "appropriate" forum for contract litigation.
a. The New Convenience Analysis
In holding that forum selection clauses were presumptively
enforceable, the Court in Bremen indicated that private choice would
ordinarily displace consideration of at least the private-interest factors
reflected in normal forum non conveniens analysis. 8 The Court focused
on the foreseeability of that kind of inconvenience in reaching this
conclusion. Responding to the defendant's argument that litigating in
London, the chosen forum, would cause it substantial inconvenience, the
Court stated:
Where it can be said with reasonable assurance that
at the time they entered the contract, the parties to a
freely negotiated private international commercial
agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is
difficult to see why any such claim of inconvenience
should be heard to render the forum clause
unenforceable. 9
The case thus suggests that a defendant who agreed to a particular
forum in advance of litigation could not, in the event of litigation there,
raise its own inconvenience as a reason for dismissal.4" This then alters
traditional forum non conveniens analysis by eliminating from
consideration those factors relating to private convenience.4'
In establishing the criteria for enforcement of forum selection
clauses, however, the Court did set forth a different form of convenience
analysis. While holding forum selection clauses to be prima facie valid,
the Court noted that enforcement could be denied if a clause was found
to be "unreasonable and unjust."42 One reason a chosen forum might be
38. Id. at 17-18.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 18 (discussing the forseeability of such forms of inconvenience). See Gruson,
supra note 34, at 180.
41. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b. (noting that the Court in Bremen did not specifically
address the continued availability of dismissal on the basis of inconvenience to the court).
42. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. Other grounds for refusing enforcement include defects in
formation such as "fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power." Id. at 12.
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found unreasonable is if it were "seriously inconvenient," in which case,
the Court suggested, its selection by the parties could be ignored in favor
of litigation initiated by the plaintiff in a U.S. forum. 43  Although this
formulation does permit considerations of litigant convenience,
subsequent cases have read this exception quite narrowly. Certainly in
commercial contracts, but in many consumer contracts as well, courts
have upheld bargains as to forum despite the resulting inconvenience to
one of the parties in ensuing litigation." Overall, cases finding grave
inconvenience are quite rare. 5
b. Departure From "Natural Forum "Analysis
Another effect of Bremen was to render the broader convenience
analysis - including public-interest factors as well as private-interest
ones - less relevant in cases involving a negotiated forum selection. As
discussed above, the goal of forum non conveniens analysis in the United
States is largely to identify the most suitable forum for a particular case.46
In Bremen, however, the Court enforced the selection of a neutral forum,
thereby indicating that a lack of contacts between the chosen forum and
the parties and their transaction, and any inconvenience resulting from
litigation in a forum lacking such contacts, would not render the choice
of forum unenforceable. 47  Rather, the question was simply whether the
parties had a reason for selecting the neutral forum.4t In the case itself,
43. Id. at 18 (establishing a high standard for this argument and placing the burden of proof
on the defendant). The defendant must show that litigating in the chosen forum "will be so
gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day
in court." Id. This approach is quite different from that used in pre-Bremen cases that
enforced forum selection clauses, in which "reasonableness" was viewed as synonymous with
regular convenience. Gruson, supra note 34, at 141-45.
44. The Supreme Court applied the Bremen rule to a case involving a domestic forum
selection clause within a non-negotiated passenger contract in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Although the Court did not address whether its holding would
extend to foreign forum selections, subsequent cases have viewed the decision as precedential
in the international context. See id. at 604 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Sudduth v. Occidental Peruana, Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d 691, 695 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
(holding that U.S. employees who entered into an international employment contract
containing a forum-selection clause in favor of Peru "would, in all probability, be unable to
afford to travel back to Peru for purposes of litigation"). The district court concluded that
enforcing the clause would deprive the plaintiffs of their day in court. Id. at 696.
46. See Brand, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17-18.
48. See, e.g., Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc. v. Ricoh, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417,
427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the choice of the New York courts was reasonable
due to those courts' expertise in commercial litigation. "Thus, there is nothing irrational about
the forum selected by the contract which would defeat its enforcement.") (emphasis in
original).
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London's status as a center for maritime law made the choice
reasonable;4 9 subsequent cases have likewise approved the choice of
neutral fora with relevant expertise in the particular subject matter. The
Bremen decision does create one narrow exception to this principle: it
notes that if two U.S. parties choose "to resolve their essentially local
disputes in a remote alien forum," a court might find their selection
unreasonable."0 Thus, if parties choose a forum unconnected with their
transaction in order to complicate the initiation of a lawsuit, or in order to
avoid otherwise applicable local law, a court would not enforce the
forum selection clause. In general, however, U.S. courts do not view a
connection between the chosen forum and the parties or their transaction
as necessary.5'
B. Balancing Private Choice and Judicial Discretion
Post-Bremen, then, the private role in forum selection in
international contracts has become relatively strong. This is not to say,
however, that judicial discretion regarding forum selection plays no role
at all. As the Seventh Circuit put it in a recent case, "there really is
something special about forum selection clauses after all. They could
interfere with the orderly allocation of judicial business and injure other
third-party interests (that is, interests of persons other than the parties to
the contract containing the clause) as well."52 This articulation captures
the dual purpose of U.S. forum non conveniens doctrine. Its intent is to
prevent vexation and oppression of the defendant, but also to permit the
court to correct selections that unreasonably burden the judicial system. 3
It also raises directly the question implied by the Bremen decision: how
to reconcile the strong role for private forum selection with the court's
authority to consider those aspects of convenience analysis that address
factors other than the convenience of the parties themselves.
49. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 (approving the parties' decision to seek a neutral forum "with
expertise in the subject matter" and noting that the English courts "meet the standards of
neutrality and long experience in admiralty litigation").
50. Id. at 17.
51. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
414 (3d ed. 1996).
52. N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding, with
respect to a domestic forum selection, that a forum selection clause should be enforced unless
such third-party interests would be infringed); see also Noto v. Cia Secula di Armanento, 310
F.Supp. 639, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting that jurisdictional analysis must consider protecting
"not only the immediate defendant from harassing and vexatious litigation, but also other
litigants and the community at large from unwarranted imposition upon the local courts'
jurisdiction").
53. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
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In Bremen, the Supreme Court did not address any possible public
interest factors that might have played into the analysis, although the
Court decided the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The decision
therefore provides little guidance on how to consider a public interest-
oriented convenience issue in the face of a forum selection clause.
Subsequent cases reflect a variety of approaches to this question and,
more fundamentally, to the basic question whetherforum non conveniens
is available at all in cases involving a valid forum selection clause. In
these subsequent cases, the question is how courts use the "competing
rubrics of improper venue/forum non conveniens and contract law" to
analyze the enforceability of forum selection clauses.54 These decisions
reflect the different ways in which courts have struck the balance
between private and public interests.
It is worth noting that there is substantial confusion surrounding the
procedural aspects of enforcing a forum selection clause.55 Litigants are
often unsure of how to move for enforcement, and courts order relief on
a number of different bases, from improper venue to lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.56 In addition, while some courts apply the law of the
U.S. forum to decide the enforceability of a forum selection clause,
others apply the foreign law of the chosen forum.57 Finally, in federal
diversity cases, courts differ on whether state law or the federal common
law rule articulated in Bremen should be applied in most cases involving
international commerce.58 Much of this confusion reflects the blend of
substantive and procedural issues that selection clauses present: while
proper venue is a matter of procedure, the enforceability of a negotiated
forum selection is also a matter of substantive contract law. Against this
backdrop, it is not surprising that cases reflect a variety of different
54. Ferraro Foods, Inc. v. M/V Izzet Incekara, No. 01 CIV.2682, 2001 WL 940562, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
55. Professor Park notes that "[t]here is as yet no 'Zapata motion' to compel respect for a
jurisdiction clause [under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]." WILLIAM W. PARK,
INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 33 (1995). See also Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d
1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[W]hile the forum-selection clause defense is a creature that has
evaded precise classification, most courts and commentators have characterized it as a venue
objection analogous to aforum non conveniens motion or motion for transfer of venue .... ").
56. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law:
Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 322-27
(1988) (describing the "gross analytical confusion" in this area and outlining various
approaches courts use to analyze forum selection clauses).
57. See Gruson, supra note 34, at 186.
58. See BORN, supra note 51, at 448-53; Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in
Federal Courts: Limitations on Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L.
REV. 553 (1993). See also General Engineering Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783
F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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approaches regarding the further question of what effect a forum
selection clause has on forum non conveniens analysis. 9
1. Forum Selection Precludes Forum Non Conveniens Analysis
A few courts seem to suggest that the Bremen rule displaces forum
non conveniens analysis entirely, and that the inclusion of a valid forum
selection clause in a contract essentially deprives them of the authority to
consider dismissal based on inconvenience.6" In one case representative
of this position, the court stated that "parties to a contract have the right
to agree on a forum for settling disputes, and, at least in litigation
between sophisticated business entities, a valid forum selection clause
will trump the usual considerations governing forum non conveniens."6
For courts adopting this position, the inconvenience analysis under
Bremen - under which elements of inconvenience need not be considered
unless they rise to the very high level that would cause the selection to be
unreasonable - is exclusive.
2. Forum Selection Precludes Only Consideration of Private
Convenience Factors
Many courts have held that traditional forum non conveniens
59. With respect to non-exclusive forum selection clauses, some courts have held that
ordinary forum non conveniens analysis should be available. See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco
Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding in a case involving a
permissive clause "to address the forum non conveniens issue in terms of the generally
applicable standards, rather than the heightened scrutiny required by Bremen for mandatory
forum selection clauses"); Magellan Real Estate Investment Trust v. Losch, 109 F.Supp.2d
1144 (D. Ariz. 2000) ("[T]he standard approach to the issue of forum non conveniens is
employed when a forum selection clause is merely permissive, rather than mandatory.
Therefore, the permissive forum selection clause is not entitled to weight as a factor."). Other
courts have criticized this approach, observing that even a permissive forum selection clause
evidences party agreement that litigation in the chosen forum would not be prohibitively
inconvenient. See, e.g., Blanco, 997 F.2d at 985 (Oakes J., dissenting). See also La Reunion
Francaise, S.A. v. La Costena, 818 So.2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that a
permissive clause reflects the availability of an adequate alternative forum).
60. See, e.g., Evolution Online Systems, Inc. v. Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V., 145 F.3d
505 (2d Cir. 1998) (suggesting that the court would considerforum non conveniens only in the
event that the parties had not reached an agreement on forum selection); Von Graffenreid v.
Craig, 246 F. Supp. 2d 553, 563 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (describing a valid forum selection clause as
"outcome determinative" of a motion to dismiss); AAR Int'l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enter. S.A., 250
F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing a permissive forum selection clause that also explicitly
waived convenience-based objections and, comparing that clause to exclusive forum
selections, holding that "the stricter standards announced in Bremen ... should control the
analysis of the appellees'forum non conveniens motion").
61. Sempra Energy Trading Corp. v. Algoma Steel, Inc., No. 00 CIV.9227, 2001 WL
282684 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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analysis is available in cases involving negotiated forum selections, but
should proceed minus the factors that address the convenience of the
parties themselves.62 On this view, because a party agreeing to the clause
has thereby indicated that litigation in the chosen forum would not be
prohibitively costly or burdensome, it should not be able to reintroduce
such concerns through a forum non conveniens motion.63 The court,
however, could either raise forum non conveniens sua sponte6 in
response to public interests such as judicial efficiency, or, presumably,
consider a convenience issue relevant to someone other than one of the
parties to the contract. This approach apparently assumes that Bremen
did not intend to foreclose consideration of at least the public interest
factors protected by forum non conveniens analysis.
3. Forum Selection is Merely One Element in Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis
Some courts have held that a valid forum selection clause should be
viewed simply as one factor in a full forum non conveniens analysis. On
this view, the court may consider even the convenience of the party
resisting the clause as a basis for dismissal.65 Courts adhering to this
view vary in the weight they assign a forum selection clause. In one
case, the court described a forum selection clause as "simply one of the
62. See Overseas Partners, Inc., v. PROGEN Musavirlik ve Yonetim Hizmetleri, Ltd.
Sikerti, 15 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 1998). See also William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in
International Forum Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135, 159 (1995) ("Whereas the parties'
agreement to a particular forum may overcome some of the chosen forum's inconvenience,
challenge to courts designated by jurisdiction agreements will likely be clothed in the garb of
'public interests."). But see Morgan Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Hydraroll, Ltd., 759 A.2d 926, 931
(Pa. 2000) (purporting to accept the Bremen standard, but holding a negotiated clause
unreasonable on the ground that witnesses and evidence were located locally rather than in the
chosen forum). Accord Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953
(3d Cir. 1978).
63. This analysis flows from Bremen itself. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.a. It would
still be possible for a plaintiff to argue that the clause in fact did not reflect party expectations,
and therefore should not preclude consideration of private convenience factors. See, e.g., In re
Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation, 228 F. Supp.2d 348, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (traditional forum non conveniens analysis appropriate partly because the
clause did not reflect party expectations, as "[tlhe extent of plaintiffs' present-day
inconvenience was not foreseeable to the parties at the time of contracting. Those
inconveniences were caused by the Holocaust").
64. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
65. See, e.g., Meridian Seafood Products, Inc. v. Fianzas Monterrey S.A., 149 F. Supp. 2d
1234 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (finding an enforceable forum selection clause, but then proceeding
through a full analysis of both private and public factors); Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products
Co., 919 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1990) (taking a similar view in the context of arbitration, applying
regularforum non conveniens analysis in the face of an arbitration clause).
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factors that should be considered and balanced by the courts in the
exercise of sound discretion. '66 In another, the court fully considered all
private- and public-interest factors, but noted that a forum selection
clause "heavily favors dismissal."67  Interestingly, in considering this
issue in the domestic context - when the defendant sought transfer to
another U.S. court rather than dismissal in favor of a foreign forum - the
Supreme Court held that a valid selection clause was only one factor to
consider in a broader convenience analysis.68
C. Conclusion
Surveys of decisions addressing contracts that contain forum
selection clauses suggest that litigation is steered toward the chosen
forum in the great majority of cases. 69 Nevertheless, the ability of judges
to consider factors external to the contractual relationship, and to direct a
case to a different forum on the basis of those factors, necessarily injects
uncertainty into the contracting process. Particularly in the international
context, this is costly.7" Previous efforts to codify the application of
forum non conveniens in contract cases have done little to eliminate such
uncertainty. The Model Choice of Forum Act drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, for instance,
66. Royal Bed & Spring Co., Inc. v. Famossul Industria E Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906
F.2d 45, 51 (lst Cir. 1990).
67. Mobil Sales & Supply Corp. v. Republic of Lithuania, No. 97 CIV.4045, 1998 WL
196194, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The court concluded that the contract in question included a
valid and enforceable forum selection clause, but then continued with aforum non conveniens
analysis:
Even if not fully effective to require dismissal in and of itself, the clause
plainly demonstrates that the parties intended to litigate any disputes
between them... in a Lithuanian forum... Thus, in order to give effect
to that intent, the Court should dismiss this action in favor of the chosen
forum.
Id. at* 11.
68. Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (1988), permitting transfers within the federal court system "[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," to incorporate a choice of U.S. forum as
simply one factor in a general convenience analysis). Because the standard for obtaining
dismissal rather than transfer is higher, however, a negotiated selection should be expected to
count for more in aforum non conveniens case.
69. That is, the court finds the forum selection valid and does not then choose to dismiss in
favor of another, more convenient forum.
70. See PARK, supra note 55, at 31 ("Decision-making based on open-ended and ill-
determined factors such as convenience and justice may be appropriate for disputes
implicating politically sensitive community values .... In the global commercial community,
however, the relative malleability of convenience and fairness notions defeats the certainty
sought by business managers.").
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provided that a U.S. court was required to enforce a foreign forum
selection clause only if the chosen forum was not "substantially less
convenient" than the forum in which litigation was in fact initiated.71
The Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act proposed by the American Bar
Association's international section did not specifically address negotiated
forum selections, and therefore provided that a selection clause could be
ignored if its enforcement would result in "substantial inconvenience" to
the parties.72
However, scholars addressing the issue have been less
accommodating of convenience analysis. Their proposals would on the
whole reduce the question of enforceability to the issue of contractual
validity alone. Thus, if the parties bargained for a forum selection clause
that was not the product of fraud or overreaching, their agreement should
generally be enforced. One state has addressed this uncertainty
through legislation: under New York law, a state court must enforce a
forum selection clause if the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction
of New York courts and chose New York law to govern their contract,
74
and may not dismiss such an action on the basis of forum non
conveniens.75
Contracting parties can of course mitigate this uncertainty by
choosing arbitration rather than litigation as the method for eventual
71. UNIF. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM ACT §4(3) (1968) (withdrawn 1975), reprinted in
HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 219-
22 (1968).
72. See CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION MODEL ACT (1989), discussed in Louise Ellen Teitz,
Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and
Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAW. 21 app. 1 at 56-7 (1992). Teitz describes the treatment
of negotiated forum clauses as "problematic." Id. at 53.
73. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After
Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REv. 55 app. at 107-11
(1992); PARK, supra note 55, app. C at 191-92 (Model International Court Selection Act,
which is limited to transactions involving either a U.S. party or a claim under U.S. law).
74. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-1402 (McKinney 2001) (applying to contracts for transactions of
one million dollars or more). Federal courts may view this rule as applicable in diversity
actions as well. See, e.g., Cambridge Nutrition A.G. v. Fotheringham, 840 F.Supp. 299
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
75. N.Y.C.P.L.R. Rule 327(b) (McKinney 2003). In the contract context, then, other
policies trump the usual arguments about judicial convenience. Compare Credit Francais v.
Sociedad Financiera, 490 N.Y.S. 670, 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) ("New York, as the center of
international trade and finance, has expressly recognized... that its courts will be hospitable
to the resolution of all substantial contractual disputes in which the parties have agreed
beforehand that our neutrality and expertise should govern their relationship.") with Doe v.
Hyland Therapeutics, 807 F. Supp. 1117, 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("That this Court sits in 'one
of the busiest districts in the country' is undeniable, making this one of the 'congested centers'
of litigation referred to in Gilbert... The need to guard our docket from disputes with little
connection to this forum is clear .. ") (internal citations omitted).
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dispute resolution. The United Nations convention on arbitral awards,
which requires courts in member states to enforce valid arbitration
clauses in contracts, provides greater predictability than does the law on
forum selection.76 In a sense, then, the availability of the arbitration
alternative mitigates the effect of uncertainty in the judicial process -
parties for whom certainty in this matter is critical have a way of
securing it. For a variety of reasons, however, parties may believe
arbitration is inappropriate or insufficient,77 and its availability is
therefore not a reason to ignore the certainty question in the judicial
arena.
III. THE APPROPRIATE FORUM IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT CASES
U.S.forum non conveniens doctrine focuses largely on determining
which potential forum is most appropriate for the resolution of a
particular dispute. The more a court focuses on appropriateness,
however, the more likely that it will undermine important goals of
private forum selection. The following section examines several cases in
which courts consider whether the chosen forum is appropriate for the
resolution of the dispute. They illustrate particularly clearly the effect of
an emphasis on forum non conveniens analysis in contract litigation.
A. Cases
In the first two cases below, the plaintiffs brought contract actions
in U.S. courts despite having agreed to litigate exclusively in a foreign
forum. The courts treated defendants' motions to dismiss not as a matter
of enforcement of the contractual selection, but as a matter of forum non
conveniens. Therefore, as the decisions reveal, the courts accorded far
less weight to the contractual agreement than a Bremen-style
enforceability analysis would require. In the third case, the plaintiff sued
in the chosen U.S. court. The court nevertheless considered defendant's
motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, suggesting that
it had discretion to decline jurisdiction if it found the parties' choice to
76. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 2, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 7 LL.M. 1042. The convention also provides
ready enforcement of the resulting arbitral awards.
77. See William W. Park, Bridging the Gap in Forum Selection: Harmonizing Arbitration
and Court Selection, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 28-30 (1998). See also
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Choice of Court Agreements in International
Litigation: Their Use and Legal Problems to Which they Give Rise in the Context of the
Interim Text, Preliminary Document No. 18, n.4 at www.hcch.netle/workprog/jdgm.html (Feb.
2002) [hereinafter Choice of Court Agreements in International Litigation].
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have been inappropriate.
1. Mercier v. Sheraton International'8
In this 1991 case, the First Circuit addressed claims by U.S.
plaintiffs arising out of their failed agreement with an international hotel
chain to operate a casino in Turkey.79 The Protocol between the parties,
which apparently contained their understanding of the agreement
between them, included a forum-selection clause and choice-of-law
clause in favor of Turkey."° When the plaintiffs sued in Massachusetts
despite these clauses, the district court granted the hotel chain's motion
to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.8 In doing so, the court
considered the forum selection clause as one among several factors
indicating that the case had little to do with Massachusetts.82
The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court
had improperly balanced the forum non conveniens factors and
remanding the case for reevaluation of those factors.83 In reviewing the
district court's conclusion, the Court of Appeals focused primarily on
whether the dispute was "local to the United States."84  Because the
contract was executed in Turkey and dealt entirely with a business
endeavor in that country, the resulting dispute was not of the "essentially
local" character that might defeat its enforcement under the Bremen
standard. The court followed its own recent decision that a forum
selection clause was only one factor in forum non conveniens analysis, 86
however, and therefore viewed the question of localization more broadly.
It suggested that the U.S. citizenship of the parties triggered the public
interest of the United States in providing a convenient forum for its
citizens, and also justified imposing jury duty on U.S. citizens. 87 Thus,
by situating this inquiry within forum non conveniens analysis, the court
engaged in a considerably less deferential review of the parties' selection
than a reasonableness analysis under Bremen would have indicated. The
court remanded for a rebalancing of the forum non conveniens factors,
78. 935 F.2d 419 (lst Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 421-22.
80. Id. at 422.
81. Id. at421.
82. Id. at 429.
83. Id. at 429-30.
84. Id. at 429.
85. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
86. Mercier, 935 F.2d at 429 n.13, citing Royal Bed & Spring Co., Inc. v. Famossul
Industria E Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1990).
87. Mercier, 935 F.2d at 430.
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and therefore did not itself conclude where the litigation would most
appropriately be heard. However, its analysis suggested that the
transaction's links with the United States might permit the local court to
deny the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, and
thereby to retain the case despite the existence of a contractually valid
forum agreement.
2. Apotex Corp. v. Istituto Biologico Chemioterapico S.p.a.88
In Apotex, a federal district court considered litigation arising out of
a supply agreement between a U.S. plaintiff and an Italian defendant that
contained an exclusive forum selection clause in favor of Italy.89
Although the court noted the Bremen standard for enforcement of forum
selection clauses, it considered all of the defendant's arguments for
dismissal within the context of its motion to dismiss on the basis of
forum non conveniens.9° The court therefore engaged in traditional
forum non conveniens analysis, considering the Gilbert factors relating to
the convenience of the litigants as well as that of the tribunal. The court
began this analysis by attempting to determine whether the dispute was
connected primarily with Illinois or with some other jurisdiction:
Borrowing from the closely-related issue of choice of law, the court
notes that Illinois courts adhere to the 'most significant contacts' test to
determine which law applies in a contractual dispute. Although the
record is not entirely clear on all these factors, it would be a stretch to
conclude that Illinois had the most significant contacts regarding the
Supply Agreement. 9
The court thus recognizes the strength of the Bremen presumption in
favor of enforceability, but nevertheless focuses on the connections
between the dispute and particular locations. Further, its analysis implies
that if the most significant contacts of the parties and their transaction
had in fact been in Illinois, those contacts would speak in favor of
retaining jurisdiction there despite the parties' valid selection of a foreign
forum.
3. Paradis Enterprises Ltd. v. Sapir9 2
This case involved a New York defendant who had incurred
gambling debts in a Bahamas casino while on a trip organized by the
88. No. 02-C5345, 2003 WL 21780965, at *1 (N.D. I11. June 30, 2003).
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id. at*8.
92. 811 A.2d 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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casino's New Jersey marketing affiliate.93 The casino sued in New
Jersey court to collect amounts due under the related credit agreement.94
Although that agreement included a non-exclusive forum selection clause
in favor of New Jersey, the defendant nevertheless moved to dismiss on
the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing that the case had insufficient
contacts with that state.95 The district court granted defendant's motion. 6
While recognizing that the defendant had agreed to the selection of New
Jersey courts, it simply concluded that New Jersey had no interest in the
case.97 The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court had erred
in applying forum non conveniens alone rather than considering the law
governing enforcement of forum selection clauses.98 The court began its
own analysis with the Bremen principle, noting its adoption by state as
well as federal courts in New Jersey. 99 Although recognizing that "there
seems to be no clear rule as to whetherforum non conveniens analysis is
required in a case where an express forum selection clause exists," the
court suggested that valid forum selection clauses should be granted
preclusive effect.' 0 However, it then went on to state that "forum non
conveniens factors are too attenuated in this case to trump the parties'
agreed choice of forum."'' Further, at the conclusion of its decision, the
court noted the following:
We emphasize that our conclusions have been
reached in the context of the record before us. The
effect of a forum selection clause in a case in which
there are not present [local] contacts to the degree that
were here shown to exist, or where it can be shown that
the litigation would be markedly burdensome to the
resources of our judiciary, will remain to be determined
in the future.'0 2
Thus, despite its strong endorsement of the Bremen principle, the
court seemed to suggest that the appropriateness of the forum in which
93. Id. at 518-19.
94. Id. at 519.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 520. This, then, was one of the relatively rare cases in which the chosen court
declined to honor the parties' choice.
98. Id. at 523.
99. Id. at 521-22.
100. Id. (noting that it was "unnecessary to rely on forum non conveniens doctrine" if a
contract contained a valid forum selection clause).
101. Id. at 523.
102. Id. at 529.
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the party initiated the action- the weight of contacts between the
transaction and that forum - was relevant even when the parties had
agreed to litigate there.
B. The Effect of Focusing on Appropriateness
These cases, which focus on the ties between the chosen forum and
the parties and their transaction, suggest that a lack of sufficient contacts
may undercut the enforceability of a valid forum selection. This
suggestion is interesting for two reasons. First, it undermines the holding
in Bremen that the selection of a neutral forum is appropriate." 3 The
ability of contracting parties to choose a neutral forum rather than the
home forum of one of the parties, or another forum more closely linked
to the transaction, is critical in international contracts.'1 4  A more
flexible, discretionary approach that uses the criterion of appropriateness
to test the enforceability of a negotiated and contractually valid selection
therefore ignores important commercial needs. Second, it highlights a
conundrum presented by forum non conveniens analysis. Dismissal
based on public-interest factors is intended partly to avoid choice-of-law
problems, yet a court considering dismissal must determine whether and
where the dispute is truly localized. This task introduces many of the
uncertainties of traditional multilateral choice-of-law methodology, in
that it requires the court to examine the weight of the various contacts
between the parties and their transaction and the particular countries
involved." 5
It is true that a court might consider the question of appropriateness,
measured by the factual contacts between the chosen forum and the
parties or their transaction, even if it analyzes a motion to dismiss as a
matter of contract enforcement alone. 6 The Bremen decision notes that
if two U.S. parties choose "to resolve their essentially local dispute in a
remote alien forum," a court may find their selection clause unreasonable
103. See discussion supra Part 11.
104. PARK, supra note 55, at 13-14.
105. See William Reynolds, The Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non
Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1680
(1992) (noting that courts generally use a "loose form of the 'center of gravity' or 'most
significant relationship' test used in conflicts law" to determine the localization of a dispute).
See also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981) (finding one reason not to
weigh a possible change in substantive law too heavily is that then "the trial court would have
to determine what law would apply if the case were tried in the chosen forum").
106. That is, even if the court believes that a negotiated forum agreement precludes forum
non conveniens analysis entirely. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
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due to resulting inconvenience.1 17 Therefore, in some cases, courts may
consider where a dispute is based in order to determine whether this
exception is available.' For this reason, precluding forum non
conveniens analysis in contract cases would not eliminate indeterminate
choice-of-law style analysis entirely. It would, however, significantly
limit its effect. If that analysis were restricted to the Bremen approach to
enforcement, the party resisting enforcement of a previously negotiated
clause would have to establish inappropriateness rising to the level of
grave inconvenience in order to defeat the clause. A showing that
another forum was merely more appropriate would not suffice. In
addition, Bremen suggests that this exception is limited to contracts
involving two U.S. parties, and therefore would not apply to the category
of international contracts in which advance agreement as to forum is
most critical. 09
IV. THE DRAFT HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS
The United States is not currently party to any treaty on forum
selection. The Hague Convention on the Choice of Court of 1965 was
opened for signature but never ratified,"0  and member states have
delayed the Hague Conference's broad jurisdiction and judgments
project, which addressed forum selection among other issues, due to
fundamental differences in their domestic jurisdictional regimes."'
However, the articles of the latter project dealing with forum selection
are now the subject of a narrower convention on choice of court
agreements in commercial transactions." 2 It is therefore an opportune
time to consider the U.S. approach to forum selection, particularly the
107. See supra. text accompanying note 49.
108. See, e.g., Pearcy Marine, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 57, 59-60 (S.D. Tex.
1993) (invalidating a clause negotiated by two U.S. parties selecting an English forum for
resolution of any dispute, but noting the possibility of overreaching, if not fraud, in the
procurement of that clause).
6, . See Park, supra note 62.
110. See Hague Convention on the Choice of Court, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/textl5e.html (last visited May 19, 2004). For a discussion of this proposal, see
PARK, supra note 55, at 30 n.92.
111. For a sampling of the commentary on this project, see Symposium: Enforcing
Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (1998).
112. See Choice of Court Convention, supra note 15; Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements:
Draft Report, March, 2004, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited May
19, 2004) [hereinafter Draft Report].
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role of judicial discretion in that selection, within the international
framework.
The notion of empowering judges to dismiss a case when the parties
have properly established jurisdiction and venue is foreign to many legal
systems. Civil-law countries generally have more restrictive
jurisdictional rules than common-law systems, and rely on those rules to
confine the plaintiffs selection of a forum in which to initiate
litigation." 3 Thus, many countries do not recognize judicial discretion to
dismiss a case over which the court has jurisdiction at all." 4 Some may
recognize particular exceptions to this rule, but these are generally
exceptions serving substantive policy rather than judicial expediency.'
Other countries - primarily common-law countries - do recognize a
general doctrine based on convenience, but one serving only to prevent
oppression of the defendant, not to reduce the administrative burden on
courts." 6 Such doctrines consider only the convenience of litigants, not
that of the courts, and therefore do not mirror U.S.-style forum non
conveniens. 1 17
These differences are even more pronounced in the context of
international contract litigation. Many systems recognize no role at all
for judicial intervention when the parties have negotiated a forum in
advance." 8 The Brussels Convention, which when adopted in 1968
113. See Brand, supra note 27, at 468. But see Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Control of
Improper Forum Selection: Some Random Remarks and a Comment on How Not to Do It, in
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 311 (Jack
L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) (arguing that civil-law systems would also benefit from the use of
judicial discretion to correct forum selection by plaintiffs, as they contain "such exorbitant
jurisdictional bases as plaintiff's nationality and the presence of assets").
114. See Choice of Court Agreements in International Litigation, supra note 77, at 7
(reviewing the laws of European countries); Juenger, supra note 113, at 313 ("On the whole,
the prevailing opinion in most civil-law countries is opposed to according judges discretion to
stay or dismiss cases that they feel can be litigated more conveniently elsewhere."). See also
KESSEDJIAN, supra note 2, at 275-76 (discussing the underlying differences in the conception
of judicial authority in common-law and civil-law jurisdictions).
115. For a statement of the differences between U.S.-style forum non conveniens analysis
and these types of provisions, see J.J. FAWCETT, DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (P.B. Carter ed., 1995).
116. Consider for example the statement of the Australian High Court: "It is a basic tenet
of our jurisprudence that, where jurisdiction exists, access to the courts is a right. It is not a
privilege which can be withdrawn otherwise than in clearly defined circumstances." Oceanic
Sun Line Special Shipping Co. Inc. v. Fay, (1988) 165 C.L.R. 197, 252.
117. See Brand, supra note 27, at 495 (concluding that the United States "appear[s] to be
alone" in including public interest factors in convenience analysis).
118. See FAWCETT, supra note 115, at 48-49. But see Choice of Court Agreements in
International Litigation, supra note 77, at 13-14 (noting that English and Australian courts
have on occasion ignored forum-selection clauses on the basis of convenience considerations).
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harmonized European law on this point, provided that member states
must enforce forum-selection clauses in favor of other member states,
with no reference to convenience analysis." 9 The Council Regulation
replacing the Convention carries over this approach. 12 ' Article 23 of the
Regulation provides that a valid forum selection clause creates
jurisdiction in the chosen court,' 2' and Article 27 that other courts must
defer to the court first seized once its jurisdiction has been established. 22
In this system, at least as between courts in Europe, there is no role for
discretionary dismissal in contract cases. 123  In most non-European
countries as well, courts lack discretion to dismiss cases in the face of an
enforceable forum selection clause.
24
In negotiating the larger Hague convention on jurisdiction and
judgments, the United States had reached a certain compromise with
other countries on the availability of forum non conveniens generally.
Article 22 of the preliminary draft convention on jurisdiction provided
that a court may dismiss a case if it is "clearly inappropriate" for it to
exercise jurisdiction, and if the court of another state is "clearly more
appropriate."' 25 However, that discretion did not extend to contract cases
involving exclusive forum selection clauses. Article 22(1) prohibited a
court with "exclusive jurisdiction" from dismissing a case, and Article 4
stated that an exclusive forum selection clause confers exclusive
jurisdiction on the chosen court.126  Thus, despite the move toward
compromise on judicial discretion generally, the draft jurisdiction and
judgments convention would have foreclosed forum non conveniens
analysis entirely in most international contract litigation.'
27
The current draft of the smaller convention, governing choice of
119. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 17, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1.
120. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 23, 2001
O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation]. Courts have interpreted this position fairly
rigidly. See, e.g., Case C-288/92, Custom Made Commercial Ltd. v. Stawa Metallbau, 1994
E.C.R. 1-2913.
121. Council Regulation, supra note 120, at art. 23.
122. Id. at art. 27.
123. See Brand, supra note 27, at 489.
124. See FAWCETr, supra note 115, at 48-49.
125. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission, Oct. 30, 1999, art. 22, available at
www.hcch.net (last visited July 14, 2004). The article also stresses that dismissal should be
granted only in "exceptional circumstances." Id.
126. Id. at arts. 22(1), 4.
127. The preliminary draft recognized certain exceptions for consumer and some other
contracts. See, e.g., id. at art. 7.
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court agreements in commercial contracts, similarly rejects the
application of forum non conveniens in litigation involving negotiated
forum selection clauses. 28 Article 5(2) of the proposed text states that a
court designated in an exclusive 2 9 forum clause "shall not decline to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a
court of another [country]."' 3 ° This approach parallels that discussed in
Part I.B.1 above, and would require U.S. courts to enforce contractually
valid forum selection clauses with no additional reference to factors of
convenience or the appropriateness of the chosen forum. 3' It would
therefore depart from current practice in many U.S. courts.
Article 18 of the draft convention sets forth one qualification to this
approach: it grants member states the option of declaring in advance that
their courts, even if selected in an exclusive forum agreement, may
refuse jurisdiction over cases in which no connection exists between the
parties or their transaction and that state. 32 Thus, the United States could
reserve for its courts the right to decline jurisdiction if chosen by non-
U.S. parties as a neutral forum. 33 Such a reservation would serve some
goals of current U.S.forum non conveniens doctrine - and, as the report
accompanying the draft convention notes, the provision was indeed
designed to accommodate countries concerned that providing a neutral
forum for the resolution of contractual disputes would "impos[e] an
undue burden on their judicial systems."' 34 Even if the United States
chooses to make this reservation upon eventual accession, however, the
convention as currently drafted would provide significantly greater
certainty than current U.S. law with respect to the enforceability of
private forum selection. In all contracts involving parties or transaction
128. See Choice of Court Convention, supra note 15.
129. The Convention states that a clause designating one specific court, or the courts of one
country, shall be deemed exclusive unless the parties state otherwise. Id. at art. 3. This
definition would therefore capture clauses such as that litigated in the Paradis Enterprises
case. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
130. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 15, at art. 5(2). Article 5(3) clarifies that "the
internal allocation of jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State" would not be
affected; thus, venue transfers between U.S. courts, as opposed to dismissals in favor of
foreign courts, would be permitted. Id. at art. 5(3).
131. Id. at art. 5(3). Article 5(3) further recognizes national laws relating to subject-matter
jurisdiction, and states that a chosen court would not be required to hear a case if such
jurisdiction were lacking. Id.
132. Id. at art. 18.
133. The reservation would not require dismissal of such cases, but merely permit it.
134. Draft Report, supra note 112, at para. 155. Countries that make such a reservation
would of course acknowledge that their own courts will not promote the value, recognized in
Bremen and elsewhere, of permitting parties to a commercial contract to agree on a neutral
forum.
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elements connected to the United States, forum non conveniens analysis
would be excluded and the parties could therefore rely on the
enforceability of an agreement selecting U.S. courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Judges can play an important role in avoiding or resolving conflict
by considering the optimal jurisdictional placement of cases with
international elements and, when necessary, correcting inappropriate
forum selections by plaintiffs. In the particular context of contract
litigation, however, the availability of judicial discretion undermines the
predictability critical to international commercial transactions. The draft
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements creates an
opportunity for the United States to rationalize the forum selection
process in international contract litigation before U.S. courts.
